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Offshore drilling only makes sense in today's grim economic times and
after a year producing historically high gas prices. Or does it? As Senator
John McCain and Governor Sarah Palin traveled the presidential campaign
trail, many Americans exclaimed "Drill, baby, drill!"-begging for the gov-
ernment to utilize the natural resources in our own backyard, rather than pay-
ing unpredictable and, at times, outrageous prices for those resources from
our foreign enemies. Still, many other Americans are fearful of such drilling
for the effect it may have on the environment and focus not on the need for
offshore drilling, but on the need for environmental responsibility. As politi-
cians balance those issues of most importance to all Americans-the econ-
omy, national security, and the environment-the future of offshore drilling
remains uncertain.
This article discusses the history of offshore drilling, judicial review of
the processes involved, and the future of offshore drilling under President
Barack Obama's administration. Early Supreme Court decisions wrestling
with ownership of the three-mile belt along the coastline of United States,
legislation discussing offshore drilling and its environmental impact, and
drilling technologies are discussed in Part B to give an overview of the his-
tory of offshore drilling in the United States. Part C will discuss the applica-
tion of the current Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA), the phases
of an offshore drilling project for the Mineral Management Service (MMS)
and the Secretary of the Interior to oversee pre-leasing, leasing, exploration,
and development and production, and recent decisions out of the D.C. Circuit
addressing the discretion of the Secretary in supervising these phases. Fi-
nally, Part D considers the differences between policies under the Bush ad-
ministration and the policy under the new Obama administration while
addressing the effects of a recent Ninth Circuit decision on the Obama ad-
ministration's plans for offshore drilling.
The new President enters office with an economic crisis, a country at
war, and many other domestic and foreign matters looming. At the onset of
the Obama administration, it is too soon to tell which promises made during
stump speeches along the campaign trail will remain a priority to the Presi-
dent. His Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar, currently remains commit-
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ted to the consideration of offshore drilling in new areas as part of a
comprehensive energy plan. But with many Obama supporters ardently op-
posed to such a plan and the Ninth Circuit's ruling making it increasingly
harder for the Secretary of the Interior to oversee such programs, the future
of offshore drilling during the Obama administration remains unwritten. It is
certain, however, that oil companies, politicians, and citizens who support
drilling in these areas as a means of gaining energy independence will not be
left unheard.
B. BACKGROUND
1. Early History and the Supreme Court
Several states, including California, Louisiana, and Texas, began issuing
leases for drilling on submerged land along their state's coast line over sixty
years ago.' They, and other coastal states, believed that they owned the tide-
lands as far out as drilling was possible and began to regulate these areas
accordingly.2 On October 1, 1945, President Harry S. Truman sought to
change this perception when he declared in a proclamation that,
Having concern for the urgency of conserving and prudently
utilizing its natural resources, the Government of the United States
regards the natural resources of the subsoil and sea bed of the
continental shelf beneath the high seas but contiguous to the
coasts of the United States as appertaining to the United States,
subject to its jurisdiction and control. In cases where the continen-
tal shelf extends to the shores of another State, or is shared with an
adjacent State, the boundary shall be determined by the United
States and the State concerned in accordance with equitable prin-
ciples. The character as high seas of the waters above the conti-
nental shelf and the right to their free and unimpeded navigation
are in no way thus affected.3
1. U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, OIL AND GAS TECHS. FOR THE ARC-
TIC AND DEEPWATER, OTA-O-270 (May 1985) at 3, available at http://
www.docstoc.com/docs/5793421/Oil-and-Gas-Technologies-for-the-Arctic-
and-Deepwater.
2. Michael J. McHale, An Introduction to Offshore Energy Exploration-A Flor-
ida Perspective, 39 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 571-74 (2008) (discussing the impor-
tance of early Supreme Court decisions in encouraging passage of legislation
regulating submerged lands).
3. Exec. Order No. 9633, 10 Fed. Reg. 12,305 (Sept. 28, 1945).
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In a series of cases during the 1940s and 1950s, the United State Supreme
Court confirmed federal control of the three-mile marginal belt along the
coast. 4
In the first of these cases, United States v. California, Justice Black
began by first recognizing the novelty of the issue before the Court.5 "The
question of who owned the bed of the sea only became of great potential
importance at the beginning of [the twentieth] century when oil was discov-
ered there."6 The first production of oil from submerged land occurred in the
late 1880s when the citizens of Summerland, California began drilling oil
from land submerged beneath the Santa Barbara Channel after discovering
that the wells closest to the ocean were the best oil producers.7 In 1921,
California passed legislation authorizing the grant of permits to California
residents for oil and gas exploration on its costal land.8 The United States
brought suit against California to determine which sovereign owned the sub-
merged land and, at the heart of the matter, which had the superior power to
take the vast quantities of oil beneath that land.9 Ultimately, the Court sided
with the federal government and held that "California is not the owner of the
three-mile marginal belt along its coast, and that the federal government
rather than the state has paramount rights in and power over that belt, an
incident to which is full dominion over the resources of the soil under that
water area, including oil."1o Thus, the Court established that the federal gov-
ernment holds the authority to determine ownership of these areas.",
Then, in the "Tidelands Cases," the Supreme Court reinforced its ruling
in United States v. California.12 Both Louisiana and Texas claimed owner-
ship to the submerged lands along their coastline beneath the Gulf of Mex-
ico.13 In United States v. Louisiana, the Court applied the same reasoning it
had in United States v. California only a few years before.14 The Court
stated,
4. United States v. California (California), 332 U.S. 19, 38 (1947); United States
v. Louisiana (Louisiana), 339 U.S. 699, 704 (1950); United States v. Texas
(Texas), 339 U.S. 707, 720 (1950).
5. California, 332 U.S. at 37.
6. Id. at 38.
7. McHale, supra note 2, at 572.
8. California, 332 U.S. at 38.
9. Id. at 23.
10. Id. at 38-39.
11. Id. at 41.
12. Louisiana, 339 U.S. at 704; Texas, 339 U.S. at 720.
13. Louisiana, 339 U.S. at 701-02; Texas, 339 U.S. at 709-12.
14. Louisiana, 339 U.S. at 704.
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[pirotection and control of the area are indeed functions of na-
tional external sovereignty. The marginal sea is a national, not a
state concern. National interests, national responsibilities, national
concerns are involved. The problems of commerce, national de-
fense, relations with other powers, war and peace focus there. Na-
tional rights must therefore be paramount in that area.15
Accordingly, the Court determined that the federal government had control
over the submerged lands at issue. 16
In United States v. Texas, which was handed down the same day as
United States v. Louisiana, Texas asserted ownership of the submerged lands
under the Gulf of Mexico beyond the three-mile limit to the outer edge of the
continental shelf.'1 Texas argued, because of its history as the Republic of
Texas, the state now had exclusive control over the lands and the resources
therein.18 The Court rejected this argument among others and upheld federal
control over the submerged lands.19
2. The Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands
Act
In response to the Supreme Court decisions on the issue, Congress en-
acted the Submerged Lands Act and the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act
in 1953.20 The Submerged Lands Act, enacted on May 22, 1953, preserved
control of the outer Continental Shelf beyond state boundaries for the federal
government and authorized leasing by the Secretary of the Interior.21
Just two months later, Congress passed the Outer Continental Shelf
Lands Act (OCSLA) on August 7, 1953, to "amend the Submerged Lands
Act in order that the area in the outer Continental Shelf beyond boundaries of
the States may be leased and developed by the Federal Government."22 The
Committee on the Judiciary, to whom the bill was referred, considered the
necessity of the legislation:
Representatives of the Federal departments, the States, and the
off-shore operators all urged the importance and necessity for the
enactment of legislation enabling the Federal Government to lease
for oil and gas operations the vast areas of the Continental Shelf
outside of State boundaries. . . . The committee is also of the opin-
15. Id.
16. Id. at 706.
17. Texas, 339 U.S. at 710-711.
18. Id. at 711.
19. Id. at 720.
20. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301, 1331 (2006).
21. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1315 (2006).
22. H.R. REP. No. 83-413 at 2177 (1953).
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ion that legislative action is necessary in order to confirm and give
validity to Presidential Proclamation 2667 of September 8, 1945,
wherein the President, by Executive declaration asserted, in behalf
of the United States, jurisdiction, control, and power of disposition
over the natural resources of the subsoil and seabed of the Conti-
nental Shelf.23
OCSLA defines "outer Continental Shelf' as "all submerged lands lying
seaward and outside of the area of lands beneath navigable waters as defined
in section 1301 of this title, and of which the subsoil and seabed appertain to
the United States and are subject to its jurisdiction and control."24 Thus, the
Act codified the view espoused by the Supreme Court that the federal gov-
ernment has control over these areas. 25
The Act gives responsibility to the Secretary of the Interior for the ad-
ministration of mineral exploration and development of the OCS, and per-
haps most significantly, authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to grant oil
and gas leases on submerged lands of the outer Continental Shelf.26 The Act,
as discussed below, now provides guidelines for implementing an oil and gas
exploration and development program on the outer Continental Shelf.27
Also, the Act provides for enforcement of the safety and environmental regu-
lations imposed on any project and the process by which suits may be
brought and remedies and penalties enforced.28 The Secretary of the Interior
designated the Minerals Management Service (MMS) as the administrative
agency charged with managing the mineral leasing of submerged outer Con-
tinental Shelf lands and for the supervision of offshore operations after lease
issuance.29
Soon after this legislation was enacted and its policies implemented, its
constitutionality was upheld by the Supreme Court in Alabama v. United
States.30 The Court noted that "[t]he power of Congress to dispose of any
kind of property belonging to the United States 'is vested in Congress with-
23. Id. at 2178.
24. 43 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (2006).
25. United States v. Louisiana (Louisiana), 339 U.S. 699, 704 (1950); United
States v. Texas (Texas), 339 U.S. 707, 720 (1950); United States v. California
(California), 332 U.S. 19, 38 (1947).
26. 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
27. 43 U.S.C. § 1346 (2006).
28. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1348-50 (2006).
29. About the Mineral Management Service, http://www.mms.gov/aboutmms/ (last
visited Jan. 4, 2010).
30. Alabama v. Texas, 347 U.S. 272, 273 (1954) (holding that the procedures set
forth in OCSLA were constitutional).
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out limitation.' "31 The Court's validation of OCSLA in Alabama confirms
the federal government's legitimacy in managing exploration for natural re-
sources in all areas of the outer Continental Shelf.32
3. National Environmental Policy Act, Coastal Zone Management
Act, Clean Water Act, and Amendments to the Outer
Continental Shelf Lands Act
Illustrating the complaints of many environmental groups about the dan-
gerous effects of drilling, a ghastly oil spill occurred in Santa Barbara, Cali-
fornia, on January 29, 1969.33 As workers were making adjustments to the
pipe, a natural gas blowout occurred and released oil and gas into the Earth.34
As workers fought to remedy the situation and stop the liquid from pouring
into the ocean, thousands of animals were killed, including seals, dolphins,
and birds.35 The catastrophe reminded many of the hazards of such explora-
tion and even moved Congress to pass legislation in response.
After the spill, Congress passed the National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA), the Coastal Zone Management Act (CZMA), and the Clean Water
Act (CWA). The NEPA mandates an environmental review in the form of an
Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) before any major federal action, in-
cluding the Secretary of the Interior's authorization of oil and gas leases.36
Specifically, the Act requires all agencies to:
include in every recommendation or report on proposals for legis-
lation and other major Federal actions significantly affecting the
quality of the human environment, a detailed statement by the re-
sponsible official on-
(i) the environmental impact of the proposed action,
(ii) any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented,
(iii) alternatives to the proposed action,
(iv) the relationship between local short-term uses of man's
environment and the maintenance and enhancement of long-
term productivity, and
31. Id. at 273.
32. Id.
33. Santa Barbara's 1969 Oil Spill, http://www.sbwcn.org/edu/spill.php?PHPSESS
ID=9ac5cfa2732al7f899b8c6c6cl94f0bf (last visited January 4, 2010) (dis-
cussing the tragic oil spill in Santa Barbara, the ecological impact the spill had
on the area and efforts to bring awareness to the dangers of oil spills).
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. 42 U.S.C. § 4332 (2006).
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(v) any irreversible and irretrievable commitments of re-
sources which would be involved in the proposed action
should it be implemented.37
Subsequently, the CZMA, passed in 1972, requires state review of fed-
eral action that would affect land and water use in the coastal zone.38 It is
unclear whether or not the CZMA applies to OCS leases due to the Supreme
Court's decision in Secretary of the Interior v. California.39 Finally, in 1977,
Congress passed the CWA to regulate the discharge of pollutants into surface
waters. 40 In particular, the CWA prohibits all discharges of pollutants unless
the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) has first issued a permit and the
pollutants are emitted pursuant to that permit.41 For violations of the CWA,
as in the case of oil spills, the EPA can issue administrative orders and may
also seek civil or criminal penalties.42
In addition, the spill in Santa Barbara, California led to the proposal of
several amendments to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA),
which were ultimately passed in 1978.43 Congress explained that the purpose
of the amendments was to:
(1) establish policies and procedures for managing the oil and nat-
ural gas resources of the Outer Continental Shelf which are in-
tended to result in expedited exploration and development of the
Outer Continental Shelf in order to achieve national economic and
energy policy goals, assure national security, reduce dependence
on foreign sources, and maintain a favorable balance of payments
in world trade;
(2) preserve, protect, and develop oil and natural gas resources in
the Outer Continental Shelf in a manner which is consistent with
the need (A) to make such resources available to meet the Na-
tion's energy needs as rapidly as possible, (B) to balance orderly
energy resource development with protection of the human,
marine, and coastal environments, (C) to insure the public a fair
and equitable return on the resources of the Outer Continental
37. Id.
38. 16 U.S.C. § 1454 (2006).
39. Sec'y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 342-43 (1984) (holding that
the Coastal Zone Management Act's consistency provisions does not apply to
OCS lease sales because the Secretary's authorization of OCS oil and gas
leases is not an activity "directly affecting" the coastal zone).
40. 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2006).
41. 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2006).
42. Id.
43. See 43 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006).
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Shelf, and (D) to preserve and maintain free enterprise
competition;
(3) encourage development of new and improved technology for
energy resource production which will eliminate or minimize risk
of damage to the human, marine, and coastal environments;
(4) provide States, and through States, local governments, which
are impacted by Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas exploration,
development, and production with comprehensive assistance in or-
der to anticipate and plan for such impact, and thereby to assure
adequate protection of the human environment;
(5) assure that States, and through States, local governments, have
timely access to information regarding activities on the Outer
Continental Shelf, and opportunity to review and comment on de-
cisions relating to such activities, in order to anticipate, amelio-
rate, and plan for the impacts of such activities;
(6) assure that States, and through States, local governments,
which are directly affected by exploration, development, and pro-
duction of oil and natural gas are provided an opportunity to par-
ticipate in policy and planning decisions relating to management
of the resources of the Outer Continental Shelf;
(7) minimize or eliminate conflicts between the exploration, de-
velopment, and production of oil and natural gas, and the recovery
of other resources such as fish and shellfish;
(8) establish an oil spill liability fund to pay for the prompt re-
moval of any oil spilled or discharged as a result of activities on
the Outer Continental Shelf and for any damages to public or pri-
vate interests caused by such spills or discharges;
(9) insure that the extent of oil and natural gas resources of the
Outer Continental Shelf is assessed at the earliest practicable time;
and
(10) establish a fishermen's contingency fund to pay for damages
to commercial fishing vessels and gear due to Outer Continental
Shelf activities.44
In accordance with this purpose, the 1978 Amendments provide a five-year
leasing program, regulations for each phase of the leasing process (from pre-
leasing to development and production), and methods of participation in the
process for affected state and local governments, federal agents, the public,
and Congress.45 Additionally, as was the pervading theme, the amendments
established an oil spill fund to pay for any oil spill damage on the OCS.46
44. 43 U.S.C. § 1802 (2006).
45. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1337-53 (2006).
46. 43 U.S.C. § 1802(8) (2006).
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4. Drilling Technology
Offshore drilling technology poses many challenges, and therefore,
technologies have been "developed to withstand such environmental factors
as water currents, seafloor instability, mud slides, and hurricane-force winds
and waves."47 For example, because the sea floor does not provide a stable
platform for offshore drilling, an artificial drilling platform must first be cre-
ated in order to drill for resources beneath the sea. 4 8
There are two types of offshore structures used: floating structures and
bottom supported structures. 49 Exploratory drilling during OCSLA's third
phase is done primarily with floating structures because these structures are
less expensive than the bottom supported structures.50 Some examples of
floating structures include drilling barges, jack-up rigs, submersible rigs, and
semi-submersible rigs.51 Drilling barges are "large, floating platforms, which
must be towed by tugboat from location to location," and are mostly used in
shallow waters.52 Jack-up rigs are different from drilling barges in only one
respect.53 Instead of floating above the water, the jack-up rig has legs that
may be lowered to reach the sea floor.54 Though jack-up rigs are, in this
respect more stable than drilling barges, they are still impractical for use in
deep waters.55 Another floating structure is the submersible rig, which is
described as follows:
These rigs consist of platforms with two hulls positioned on top of
one another. The upper hull contains the living quarters for the
crew, as well as the actual drilling platform. The lower hull works
much like the outer hull in a submarine-when the platform is
being moved from one place to another, the lower hull is filled
with air-making the entire rig buoyant. When the rig is posi-
tioned over the drill site, the air is let out of the lower hull, and the
rig submerses to the sea or lake floor.56
47. U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 6.
48. Offshore Drilling, http://www.naturalgas.org/naturaigas/extraction-offshore.
asp (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
49. Maurice F. Funke & Bruce A. Weber, Final Report: Research and Develop-
ment Assessment on Safety and Pollution Control for Outer Continental Shelf
Operations 8 (1976), available at http://www.mms.gov/tarprojects/012/012AA.
PDF.
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Finally, semisubmersible rigs are similar to submersible rigs with one major
exception.57 Because of differences in the technology used, semisubmersible
rigs are not confined to shallow waters as are the submersible rigs.58 For this
reason, the semisubmersible rig is the most common type of offshore drilling
rig.59 But because floating structures cannot operate in water deeper than
about 6,000 feet, bottom supported structures are usually used in the later
phases of exploration.60
During the fourth phase of the process, the development and production
phase, bottom-supported structures are used.61 Because of their expense,
these structures are only practical after the exploratory phase reveals wells
that are commercially viable.62 These structures are "constructed near land,
in pieces."63 Then, as each part of the rig is completed, it is carried out to the
drilling location.64 Construction "or assembly can even take place as the rig
is being transported" from land to the drilling location in the middle of the
water. 65
5. Environmental Impact
Aside from the obvious economic impact of development and produc-
tion of these resources, perhaps the most frequently considered repercussion
of offshore drilling is the effect that it may have on the environment. First,
the literature and statutes are chiefly concerned with the occurrence of oil
spills.66 One survey of the subject, written shortly after passage of the 1978
OCSLA Amendments, notes that "[a]lthough the risk of catastrophic oil
spills from offshore operations is believed to be low, effective containment
and cleanup measures are essential in light of the potential harmful effects of
any such spill."67 A disaster of this nature first affects marine life, including
all of the species of fish, birds, and marine animals that call the water and the
surrounding lands home.68
After the effects on the animals in the early stages of the spill clean-up










66. U.S. CONG. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 10-11.
67. Id. at 10.
68. McHale, supra note 2, at 584.
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ated.69 In addition to the effects on the environment and the animals that
inhabit the area, concern must also be shown for the humans who live in the
area, as these individuals may be affected by both health risks and the dam-
age that may be done to their local economies.70 For example, fishing and
other marine-based employment may be entirely lost subsequent to an oil
spill.71
Even in the absence of an oil spill, oil exploration and production may
still impact the environment. For example, offshore drilling projects have the
potential to cause temporary or permanent hearing damage and can even af-
fect the biological functions and behavioral patterns of animals such as bow-
head whales because of their sensitivity to noise.72 Much research has been
conducted on how offshore drilling will affect the bowhead whale, an endan-
gered species, but the significance of the specific dangers to this endangered
species and others is unknown.73 Other general dangers remain unknown,
including the impact of rig and pipeline placement on animals that live near
the bottom of the ocean, the effect of the noise and human presence, and the
danger presented by pollutants often emitted during the drilling process. 74
C. CURRENT LAW
1. OCSLA Today
As the Congressional Declaration of Policy states, "the outer Continen-
tal Shelf is a vital national resource reserve held by the Federal Government
for the public, which should be made available for expeditious and orderly
development, subject to environmental safeguards, in a manner which is con-
sistent with the maintenance of competition and other national needs."75 In
this vein, the administrative agencies involved with the implementation of
the Act have struggled to maintain this balance between exploration and en-
vironmental consciousness.
To facilitate the procedure and purpose of OCSLA, the Secretary of the
Interior designated the responsibilities and supervision of leasing the outer




72. Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815, 820 (9th Cir. 2008).
73. U.S. CONGRESS, OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, supra note 1, at 10.
74. Robert B. Wiygul, The Structure of Environmental Regulation on the Outer
Continental Shelf- Sources, Problems, and the Opportunity for Change, 12 J.
ENERGY NAT. RESOURCES & ENvTL. L. 75, *7 (1992).
75. 43 U.S.C. § 1332(3) (2006).
76. About the Mineral Management Service: OCSLA Lands Act History, http:/
www.mms.gov/aboutmms/OCSLA/ocslahistory.htm (last visited Jan. 4, 2010).
2009] 65
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
day, the MMS "implements an OCS oil and gas exploration and development
program that provides the nation with 27 percent of its domestic oil produc-
tion and 15 percent of its domestic natural gas production."77
Under OCSLA, there are four stages to developing an offshore oil well:
(1) pre-leasing, (2) leasing, (3) exploration, and (4) development and produc-
tion.78 As the Supreme Court noted, because a lease may be canceled or
suspended at any time, "the purchase of a lease [standing alone] entails no
right to proceed with full exploration, development, or production."79
a. Pre-Leasing
The creation of a new five-year program consists of several phases.
First, the MMS publishes a request for comments and information regarding
the preparation of a new five-year program and announces the start of scop-
ing for the associated Environmental Impact Statement (EIS).80 The MMS
also sends letters to the governors of affected states and the heads of inter-
ested federal agencies to request their input.81
Second, after considering all the information related to the factors and
principles of Section 18 of OCSLA and other comments, the Secretary
selects a Draft Proposed Program (DPP) as the initial proposal for the five-
year program. 82 The MMS announces the DPP and Notice of Intent (NOI) to
prepare an EIS in the Federal Register and then distributes the DPP to gover-
nors of affected states and interested parties for a sixty-day comment
period.83
Third, preparation of a Proposed Program (PP) is based on further Sec-
tion 18 analyses and consideration of the comments MMS received concern-
ing the DPP.84 The MMS publishes the announcement of the PP in the
Federal Register and distributes it along with the draft of the EIS for the
five-year program to the governors of affected states and other interested
parties for a ninety-day comment period.85
77. Id.
78. Sec'y of the Interior v. California, 464 U.S. 312, 337 (1984).
79. Id. at 313.
80. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(c)(1) (2006); see 40 C.F.R. § 1501.7 (2009).
81. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(c)(1) (2006).
82. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND NAT-
URAL GAS RES.: OUTER CONT'L SHELF 10, available at http://www.mms.gov/
Id/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf.
83. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(c)(2) (2006); U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MGMT.
SERV., supra note 82, at 10, 16.
84. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MGMT. SERV., supra note 82, at 10.
85. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(c)(3) (2006); U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MGMT.
SERV., supra note 82, at 10.
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Fourth, preparation of a Proposed Final Program (PFP) is based on addi-
tional Section 18 analyses and consideration of the comments MMS received
about the PP.86 The PFP represents the third and final draft of the proposal.87
The MMS announces the PFP in the Federal Register and submits it to the
President and Congress along with summaries of any comments received and
an explanation of the responses on any recommendations from affected state
and local governments and the Attorney General.88 The MMS issues the fi-
nal EIS along with the PFP.89 Finally, sixty days after the PFP is submitted
to the President and Congress, the Secretary may approve the new five-year
program.90
b. Leasing
Under OCSLA, the Secretary of Interior has discretion to determine
when, where, and how lease sales will be conducted.91 According to Section
8:
[t]he Secretary is authorized to grant to the highest responsible
qualified bidder or bidders by competitive bidding, under regula-
tions promulgated in advance, any oil and gas lease on submerged
lands of the outer Continental Shelf which are not covered by
leases meeting the requirements of subsection (a) of section 1335
of this title.92
The Secretary does not have complete control over the bidding system,
however, because it is subject to Congressional review.93 Usually, the sale
process begins by publishing a Call for Information and Nominations and a
Notice of Intent to Prepare an EIS (NOI) in the Federal Register.94 Second,
the MMS identifies the geographical area to be considered for approval.95
86. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MGMT. SERV., supra note 82, at 10.
87. Id.
88. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(2) (2006); U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MGMT.
SERV., supra note 82, at 10.
89. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(2)(C) (2006); 43 U.S.C. § 1344(d)(2) (2006).
90. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(e) (2006); U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MGMT.
SERV., supra note 82, at 10.
91. See 43 U.S.C. § 1337 (2006).
92. Id. § 1337(a)(4).
93. Id. § 1337(a)(4).
94. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MGMT. SERV., LEASING OIL AND NAT-
URAL GAS RES.: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 16, available at http://
www.mms.gov/ld/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf.
95. Id. at 17.
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Third, a draft EIS is prepared and public hearings occur.96 After the hear-
ings, draft comments are considered and incorporated into a final EIS.97
Fourth, a Proposed Notice of Sale (a public announcement of the sale) is
issued and each affected state governor may return comments.98 Then, after
issuance of a Final Notice of Sale, the lease sales become open to the pub-
lic.99 Finally, the MMS considers the bids and issues a lease.100
Upon completion of the foregoing steps, the lease becomes effective on
the first day of the month following the date on which it is signed, and grants
"the right to explore, develop, and produce oil and/or natural gas for a spe-
cific period and from a specific tract of OCS land."lo A lease tract may not
exceed 5,760 acres and the primary term runs for five years. 0 2 But the lease
may be extended beyond the primary term if a discovery is made within the
initial term. 0 3 Regardless of discovery, the Federal Government reserves the
right to suspend or cancel the lease at any time.u4
c. Exploration
Before any exploration can occur, the lessee must submit an Exploration
Plan (EP) for review and approval.105 The MMS then has thirty days to re-
view the plan.1o6 The agency must disapprove if the plan would result in
"serious harm or damage" to the marine, coastal, or human environment.07
Once the EP is completed and approved, the lessee may begin exploring the
approved area for the natural resources. 08 In order to discover these re-
sources in commercial quantities, "the lessee will drill one or more wells
from drilling units which can be categorized as (1) floating units, such as
drillships, semisubmersibles, and drilling barges; and (2) bottom-founded
units that are floated to the drillsite but rest on the seafloor during drilling
96. Id. at 18-20.
97. Id. at 20.
98. Id. at 21-22.
99. Id. at 23.
100. Id. at 23-25.
101. Id. at 24.
102. Id. at 9, 24.
103. Id. at 25.
104. Id.
105. 43 U.S.C. § 1340(c) (2006).
106. Id.
107. 43 U.S.C. § 1334(a)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
108. U.S. DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR MINERALS MGMT. SERv., LEASING OIL AND NAT-
URAL GAS RES.: OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF 39, available at http://
www.mms.gov/ld/PDFs/GreenBook-LeasingDocument.pdf.
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operations."l09 These technologies allow the lessee to determine if commer-
cial quantities of the natural resources exist in that area.
d. Development and Production
Even after a discovery is made, the paperwork does not end for the
lessee.I10 The production operations must first appear in a DPP that is sub-
mitted to the MMS for review by affected states and other agencies.'' The
production operations will then be considered for approval.112 The MMS
discussed the development and production phase in a recent publication:
Development and production entails installation of platforms and
production systems and the drilling of development wells. In ad-
dition, onshore support facilities, if not already in place, must be
constructed. The oil and natural gas produced offshore are sepa-
rated and moved to shore for final processing. The natural gas is
transported solely by pipelines, while crude oil is moved by pipe-
line, barge, or tanker to shore facilities. All platform and artificial
island installations, platform facilities, and pipelines require the
MMS approval. Throughout the drilling and production phases,
the MMS inspects the operations to ensure compliance with
regulations.' '3
At the conclusion of production, all wells must be shut-in and equipment
must be removed from the lease premises.] 14
In all phases, from pre-leasing to development and production, the Sec-
retary of the Interior is charged with the responsibility of ensuring:
(A) safety;
(B) protection of the environment;
(C) prevention of waste;
(D) conservation of the natural resources of the outer Continental
Shelf;
(E) coordination with relevant Federal agencies;
(F) protection of national security interests of the United States;
(G) protection of correlative rights in the outer Continental Shelf:
(H) a fair return to the United States for any lease, easement, or
right-of-way under this subsection;
109. Id.
I 10. See id.
1 11. Id.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 40.
114. Id.
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(I) prevention of interference with reasonable uses (as determined
by the Secretary) of the exclusive economic zone, the high seas,
and the territorial seas;
(J) consideration of-
(i) the location of, and any schedule relating to, a lease, ease-
ment, or right-of-way for an area of the outer Continental
Shelf; and
(ii) any other use of the sea or seabed, including use for a
fishery, a sealane, a potential site of a deepwater port, or
navigation.11
2. Judicial Review and Citizen Suits under OCSLA
Generally, the OCSLA permits citizen suits and judicial review of the
decisions of the Secretary of the Interior.]16 The decision of the Secretary of
the Interior to approve a leasing program is subject to judicial review only in
the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia.17 Then, the
decision of the Secretary "to approve, require modification of, or disapprove
any exploration plan or development and production plan under the [OCSLA
is] subject to judicial review only in a United States Court of Appeals for a
circuit in which an affected state is located."' 8
Citizen suits are not allowed in matters concerning the Secretary's leas-
ing program approval, exploration plans, or any development and production
plan."19 Judicial review of these actions is only available to a person who
participated in the administrative proceedings related to the actions in ques-
tion, is adversely affected, files a petition for review of the Secretary's action
within sixty days after the date of the action, and promptly transmits copies
of the petition to the Secretary and Attorney General.120
For matters not specifically excluded by the Act, "any person having a
valid legal interest which is or may be adversely affected may commence a
civil action on his own behalf to compel compliance with this subchapter
against any person, including the United States, and any other government
instrumentality or agency."I21 A maximum fine of $20,000 is available as a
civil penalty.122 Also, for a number of actions, criminal penalties including a
fine of not more than $100,000, imprisonment of not more than ten years, or
115. 43 U.S.C. § 1337(p)(4) (2005).
116. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(1) (2006).
117. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c)(1) (2006).
118. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c)(2) (2006).
119. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c)(3) (2006).
120. Id.
121. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(a)(1) (2006).
122. 43 U.S.C. § 1350(b)(1) (2006).
70 [Vol. XIII
The Future of Offshore Drilling
both, are available.123 Each day a violation occurs constitutes a separate vio-
lation for the calculation of both civil and criminal penalties.124
3. Challenging OCSLA Five-Year Programs: Watt I, Watt II, and
Hodel
The first three five-year programs prepared and approved under Section
18 of the OCSLA were challenged in court in 1980, 1982, and 1987.125
These decisions generally granted the Secretary of Interior wide discretion in
approving five-year programs.12 6 Subsequently, no lawsuits were filed chal-
lenging the five-year programs approved for 1992-1997, 1997-2002, and
2002-2007.
a. Watt I
In the first decision to challenge a five-year program, California v. Watt
(Watt I), the court made it clear that the Secretary would be given great
deference to make decisions regarding the OCS.127 In 1980, after a sixty-day
congressional consideration period for the 1980-1985 leasing program ex-
pired, Secretary Watt approved the Final Program which he had inherited
from Secretary Andrus, the previous Secretary of the Interior.128 The Pro-
gram specified, in pertinent part, proposed sales in the Gulf of Mexico, the
Atlantic, the coast of California, and the coast of Alaska.129
First, the court determined the standard of review to be applied when
considering the Secretary's decisions and decided upon a hybrid approach.
The court reasoned:
[w]hen reviewing findings of ascertainable fact made by the Sec-
retary, the substantial evidence test guides our inquiry. When re-
viewing the policy judgments made by the Secretary, including
those predictive and difficult judgmental calls the Secretary is
called upon to make, we will subject them to searching scrutiny to
ensure that they are neither arbitrary nor irrational . . . . Finally, in
reviewing the leasing program, the Secretary's interpretation of
section 18 or its component provisions may be in issue. In passing
thereon, we adhere to the principle that the interpretation of a stat-
123. 43 U.S.C. § 1350(c) (2006).
124. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1350(b), (c) (2006).
125. Natural Res. Def. Council v. Hodel (Hodel), 865 F.2d 288, 293 (D.C. Cir.
1988); California v. Watt (Watt II), 712 F.2d 584, 590 (D.C. Cir. 1983); Cali-
fomia v. Watt (Watt 1), 668 F.2d 1290, 1300 (D.C. Cir. 1981).
126. Wiygul, supra note 74, at 10.
127. Watt 1, 668 F.2d at 1302.
128. Id. at 1300.
129. Id.
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ute by those entrusted with its administration is entitled to sub-
stantial deference.130
Applying this seemingly confusing hybrid approach, the court found
that the Secretary erred by failing to comply with the Act in several ways.' 3'
The Secretary's errors included failing to consider developmental benefits
and environmental risks, failing to consider relative environmental sensitivity
and marine productivity, as well as failing to qualify environmental costs to
the extent that they were quantifiable.132 Instead of striking down the plan
altogether, the court remanded the program "for reconsideration in accor-
dance with the Act, and with opportunity for public comment, and approval
by the new Secretary of Interior."33 Specifically, the court noted that the
Secretary would be able to remedy these issues during the process of prepar-
ing a new five-year program for 1982-1987.134
b. Watt II
In 1982, the court issued an order adopting the Secretary's position that
the remand could be met during revision, and the court approved the Secre-
tary's timetable for its completion.'13 Subsequently, the Secretary approved
the final five-year program for 1982-1987.136 Petitioners in California v.
Watt (Watt II) challenged various aspects of that plan.137
First, petitioners claimed that the size and location of the leasing activity
were not as precise as required by section 18(a).138 The court rejected this
claim, finding that section 18(a) requires as much precision as present infor-
mation supports, and so perfect precision is not necessary.139 Therefore, the
Secretary's description of the size and location was sufficiently precise.140
Next, petitioners argued that the Secretary failed to consider the section
18(a)(2) factors as required.'14 The factors required under section 18(a)(2)
include:
130. Id. at 1302.
131. Id. at 1325.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 1326.
134. Id.
135. Watt II, 712 F.2d at 590.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id. at 591.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 592.
141. Id. at 594.
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(A) existing information concerning the geographical, geological,
and ecological characteristics of such regions;
(B) an equitable sharing of developmental benefits and environ-
mental risks among the various regions;
(C) the location of such regions with respect to, and the relative
needs of, regional and national energy markets;
(D) the location of such regions with respect to other uses of the
sea and seabed, including fisheries, navigation, existing or pro-
posed sealanes, potential sites of deepwater ports, and other antici-
pated uses of the resources and space of the outer Continental
Shelf;
(E) the interest of potential oil and gas producers in the develop-
ment of oil and gas resources as indicated by exploration or
nomination;
(F) laws, goals, and policies of affected States which have been
specifically identified by the Governors of such States as relevant
matters for the Secretary's consideration;
(G) the relative environmental sensitivity and marine productivity
of different areas of the outer Continental Shelf; and
(H) relevant environmental and predictive information for differ-
ent areas of the outer Continental Shelf.142
The Court determined that the Secretary had fully considered the factors for
consideration when performing the balancing analysis required by section
(a)(3).143 Further, the Court found the Secretary's cost-benefit analysis to be
reasonable.144
The other claims came from states affected by the plan. The states of
Washington and Oregon contended that the Secretary did not adequately con-
sider the effects of the five-year program on their states. In particular, they
argued that the Secretary's analysis with respect to the impact of the program
on the environment as required by the OSCLA and the NEPA was severely
lacking.145 The Court rejected each of these arguments, finding that the Sec-
retary complied with both the OCSLA and the NEPA as required.146 Since
the Secretary's decisions were "reasonable and supported by the evidence in
the record to the extent required by section 18," the Secretary's five-year
program, as amended from Watt I, was upheld. 147
142. 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(2) (2006).
143. Watt 11, 712 F.2d at 599 (applying 43 U.S.C. § 1344(a)(3) (2006)).
144. Watt II, 712 F.2d at 600.
145. Id. at 608.
146. Id. at 610.
147. Id. at 611.
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c. Hodel
In 1985, the D.C. Circuit reviewed Secretary Hodel's 1980-1985 deci-
sions under both the NEPA and OCSLA.148 Under the NEPA, Petitioner (the
National Resource Defense Council) argued that the Secretary should have
considered conservation policies, including "requiring more stringent appli-
ance efficiency standards and stricter automobile fuel economy standards" in
order to eliminate the need for the leasing program.149 Although the court
recognized that the Secretary does in fact have a duty to consider reasonable
conservation solutions, the court found that the Secretary had fulfilled this
duty. 150
When reviewing actions under the NEPA, the court stated that "as long
as the agency's decision is 'fully informed' and 'well-considered,' it is enti-
tled to judicial deference and a reviewing court should not substitute its own
policy judgment."'5' The only role of a court analyzing a federal officer's
actions under the NEPA is to "ensure that the statement contains sufficient
discussion of the relevant issues and opposing viewpoints to enable the deci-
sionmaker to take a 'hard look' at environmental factors, and to make a rea-
soned decision."152 Thus, even though the court found the Secretary's
analysis of the impacts of the program on migratory species inadequate, the
court only asked the Secretary to make further examinations that were ade-
quate in the Secretary's view.15 3
Then, considering the OCSLA issues, the court reaffirmed the standards
of review applied in Watt I and Watt II:
those deferential standards require that the record show that the
Secretary's factual determinations are based upon substantial evi-
dence, that the Secretary's policy judgments are based upon ra-
tional consideration of identified, relevant factors, and that the
Secretary's construction of the statute is permissible . . . . When
the Secretary's program meets these standards, we defer to his
findings, interpretations, and judgments; when it does not, we re-
mand for his appropriate consideration or action.154
148. Nat'l Res. Def. Council v. Hodel (Hodel), 865 F.2d 288 (D.C. Cir. 1988).
149. Id. at 295.
150. Id. at 296-97.
151. Id. at 294 (citing North Slope Borough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 599 (D.C. Cir.
1980)).
152. Hodel, 865 F.2d at 294 (quoting Izaak Walkton League of Am. v. Marsh, 655
F.2d 346, 371 (D.C. Cir. 1981)).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 300 (citing both California v. Watt (Watt 1), 668 F.2d 1290 (D.C. Cir.
1981) and California v. Watt (Watt II), 712 F.2d 584 (D.C. Cir. 1983)).
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Applying these standards of review, the court considered petitioners' allega-
tion that the Secretary arbitrarily included and excluded certain areas under
the five-year plan.155 The court found, as the government argued, that the
Secretary met his burden by explanations included in the letters the Secretary
sent to the affected states' governors.156 Finally, under OCSLA, the court
held that the Secretary completed the requisite cost-benefit analysis and that
the Secretary did not err in reducing the minimum bid price.'57
Separately, under section III of Public Law 99-591, the People of the
State of California also challenged the five-year program. 58 In pertinent
part, this public law provides:
(a) The Secretary of the Interior may consider and accept, as part
of the Outer Continental Shelf oil and gas leasing program for
1987 to 1992, any recommendation included in any proposal sub-
mitted to him with respect to lease sales on the California Outer
Continental Shelf by the . . . Governor of California on May 7,
1986. The major components of those proposals shall be ex-
amined in the final environmental impact statement for the pro-
gram. Consideration or acceptance of any such recommendation
shall not require the preparation of a revised or supplemental draft
environmental impact statement.
(b) The Secretary shall submit a copy of the draft proposed final
leasing program for offshore California to the cochairmen of the
negotiating group referred to in subsection (a) . . . . When submit-
ting the proposed final leasing program to the President and the
Congress in accordance with section 18(d) of the Outer Continen-
tal Shelf Lands Act (43 U.S.C. 1344(d)), such submission shall
indicate in detail why any specific portion of the proposals re-
ferred to in subsection (a) of this section was not accepted.159
California argued that the Secretary did not provide adequate explanations
for rejecting portions of proposals submitted by the Governor of California
under section 111.160 The court ruled that, unlike the OCSLA and NEPA
issues, judicial review was not available for this issue.161 After assessing the
issues above, the court remanded the portion of the case requiring the Secre-
155. Hodel, 865 F.2d at 300-06.
156. Id. at 305.
157. Id. at 307-316.
158. Id. at 316.
159. Pub. L. No. 99-591 § Ill (Ca. 1986).
160. Hodel, 865 F.2d at 316.
161. See id. at 317-18.
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tary to perform an analysis of the impacts of the program on migratory spe-
cies, but upheld the program in all other respects.162
The D.C. Circuit did not agree with how the Secretary weighed each
factor required of each test or how he made other specific discretionary deci-
sions. These decisions are notable, however, because in each case the court
relied heavily on the discretion of the Secretary to carry out the proper analy-
sis in accordance with the statutes. Together, these cases mean "there will be
very few cases in which a secretarial decision to include a tract for leasing in
the five-year plan can successfully be challenged."163 Therefore, the chal-
lengers to such plans will have a seemingly insurmountable obstacle to over-
come in bringing suit against the Secretary of the Interior.
D. ANALYSIS
When considering the issue of offshore drilling, Congress and the Presi-
dent must consider the effects such drilling will have on the economy, gas
prices, the environment, and on national security. First, many suggest that if
drilling is allowed, gas prices will decrease dramatically and thus allow our
economy to rebound and rescue the nation from the current economic slow-
down.164 Those who oppose drilling, however, argue that because of the
amount of time necessary to approve the leases and to actually begin produc-
ing resources, drilling is not the answer to the ailing economy. 65 Second, it
is beyond argument that offshore drilling inflicts some amount of harm on
the environment, though many differ as to the extent of the harm inflicted.166
Finally, it cannot be disputed that the United States is dependent on foreign
countries for oil, for it has been estimated that at least twenty-five percent of
oil imported into the United States originates from the Middle East.167 After
the attacks of September 11th and the increasing tensions between the United
States and the Middle East, such reliance can no longer be substantiated. Our
dependence on foreign countries gives those nations leverage over our na-
tion, thereby decreasing U.S. national security.168
162. See id. at 319.
163. Wiygul, supra note 74, at 13.
164. GreenPeace.org, Offshore Drilling-It's NOT the Answer to High Gas Prices




167. Lynn S. Sletto, Piecemeal Legislative Proposals: An Inappropriate Approach
to Managing Offshore Oil Drilling, 33 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 557, 580
(2003) (discussing the ineffectiveness of legislation in regulating offshore
drilling).
168. Id. at 580-581.
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1. Policy under the Bush Administration
From the beginning of President George W. Bush's time in office, he
emphasized energy policy. In his first State of the Union Address on January
29, 2002, he recognized the interdependence of the economy and energy pol-
icy.169 "Good jobs also depend on reliable and affordable energy. This Con-
gress must act to encourage conservation, promote technology, build
infrastructure, and it must act to create energy production at home so
America is less dependent on foreign oil."170 President Bush's energy plan
included opening oil exploration in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge
(ANWR) and in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS).171 At first, drilling in
ANWR was President Bush's main focus because of his hesitancy to drill in
the OCS, but his proposal to drill in ANWR would not make it out of Con-
gress. 7 2 Unfortunately, then, both facets of Bush's plan to encourage Ameri-
can energy independence were abandoned.'7 3
In his second term, as the economic crisis worsened, President Bush
focused on opening up certain areas of the OCS for offshore drilling. Many
were astonished to hear of such a plan because the Bush family had taken a
negative view of offshore drilling in the past. Specifically, President George
H.W. Bush was the first president to declare a moratorium prohibiting drill-
ing on most of the areas of the OCS in 1990.174 The President's authority to
declare such a moratorium is set forth in OCSLA, which states that "[t]he
President of the United States may, from time to time, withdraw from dispo-
sition any of the unleased lands of the outer Continental Shelf."75 The for-
mer President Bush's moratorium was set to expire in 2002, but President
Bill Clinton extended the moratorium to last until 2012.176 Further, in 2002,
when drilling off Florida's coast met opposition, President Bush announced a
plan to buy back federal oil and gas leases to help his brother, Jeb Bush, who
was running for re-election in Florida at the time.v77
169. Robin Kundis Craig, The Bush Administration and the Environment: An Over-
view and Introduction, 25 W. NEw ENG. L. REV. 1, 3 (2003) (discussing Presi-
dent George W. Bush's environmental policy).
170. Id.
171. Gary C. Bryner, The National Energy Policy: Assessing Energy Policy
Choices, 73 U. CoLo. L. REV. 341, 347 (2002) (evaluating the effectiveness of
President George W. Bush's energy plan).
172. See id. at 344.
173. See id.
174. Sletto, supra note 167, at 567.
175. 43 U.S.C. § 1341(a) (2006).
176. See Jennifer Auther, Clinton Extends Moratorium on Offshore Oil drilling,
CNN, June 12, 1998, http://www.cnn.com/TECH/science/9806/12/offshore.
drilling.pm/.
177. See Craig, supra note 169, at 7.
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Despite the views of the President and the Bush family on this issue in
the past, on June 18, 2008, President Bush ended the presidential morato-
rium.78 This was not the only obstacle that would need to be surmounted.
Indeed, every year since 1981 Congress has also enacted a moratorium on
drilling in the OCS.179 Thus, not only did President Bush lift the presidential
ban on drilling in the OCS, but he also urged Congress to lift its ban, "assert-
ing that those steps and others would lower gasoline prices and 'strengthen
our national security.' "180 In an attempt to justify his changed position, Bush
stated that "scientists have developed innovative techniques to reach Anwar's
oil with virtually no impact on the land or local wildlife."' 8'
Since 2008 was in fact an election year, Bush could not refuse this
chance to make Republicans look forward-thinking and Democrats quite the
opposite.182 Specifically, he said;
I know the Democratic leaders have opposed some of these poli-
cies in the past. Now that their opposition has helped drive gas
prices to record levels, I ask them to reconsider their positions. If
Congressional leaders leave for the Fourth of July recess without
taking action, they will need to explain why $4-a-gallon gasoline
is not enough incentive for them to act.183
Environmentalists and Democrats complained of Bush's efforts to lift
the ban, implying that it was an attempt to apply a quick-fix to an economic
problem that may not be so easily remedied.184 The Democratic majority
leader, Senator Harry Reid, remarked:
[t]he facts are clear. Oil companies have already had ample oppor-
tunity to increase supply, but they have sat on their hands. They
aren't even using more than half of the public lands they already
have leased for drilling. And despite the huge tax breaks President
Bush and Republican Congresses have given oil and gas compa-
178. Sheryl Gay Stolberg, Bush Calls for End to Ban on Offshore Oil Drilling, NEW
YORK TIMES, (June 19, 2008), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/
19/washington/19drill.html?_r=1&partner=rssnyt.
179. See Auther, supra note 176.




184. See Associated Press, Bush Lifts Ban On Offshore Drilling: Congress Must Still
Lift Legislative Ban Before Controversial Drilling Can Happen, CBS News,
(July 14, 2008), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2008/07/14/national/main42
57757.shtml.
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nies to invest in refineries, domestic production has actually
dropped. 85
Another critic, Gene Karpinksi, an environmentalist and the president of the
League of Conservation Voters, condemned President Bush by claiming that
he "has once again ignored the wise precedent set by his father and taken
reckless action that has neither hope of reducing gas prices nor concern for
long-term consequences."186
Shortly after President Bush lifted the presidential moratorium on drill-
ing, the Minerals Management Service (MMS) began plans to offer certain
areas of the OCS for drilling.187 In a press conference on June 30, 2008,
President Bush's Secretary of the Interior, Dirk Kempthorne, announced the
beginning of a new leasing program for the OCS.188 Secretary Kempthorne
remarked:
When our current five-year program for Outer Continental
Shelf oil and gas leasing was launched in July 2007, oil was sell-
ing for $64 a barrel . . . Today a barrel of oil costs more than $120,
almost double the price a year ago. Clearly, today's escalating en-
ergy prices and the widening gap between U.S. energy consump-
tion and supply have changed the fundamental assumptions on
which many of our decisions were based . . . . The American peo-
ple and the President want action and this initiative can accelerate
an offshore exploration and development program that can in-
crease production from additional domestic energy resources.18 9
As described in the OCSLA section above, the process starts with a call
for information and then a comment, and as Secretary Kempthorne's press
release recognizes, the efforts taken by the MMS at the end of the Bush
Administration will give the next administration a two-year head start.190
Though the current program (2007-2012) only includes areas in the Gulf
of Mexico, Alaska, and the Atlantic not under a congressional ban, the new
plan (2010-2015) may consider any area, recognizing that congressional ac-
tion must be taken before any area under the ban may be drilled upon.191
Such areas may well be considered because it is estimated that those areas
185. Stolberg, supra note 178.
186. Associated Press, supra note 184.
187. See McHale, supra note 2, at 578-79.
188. MMS Press Release, DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR, Interior Department Initi-
ates New Five Year Oil and Gas Leasing Program for Outer Continental Shelf
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contain "an additional 18 billion barrels of oil and 76 trillion cubic feet of
natural gas in yet-to-be-discovered fields."l92
Then, on July 17, 2008, in the Federal Register, the MMS stated its
plans to open and publicly announce bids for the area beginning on August
20, 2008.193 In an effort to justify the program, the MMS estimated in a
report that the oil and gas production occurring on the OCS supplies the
United States with twenty-seven percent of the domestic oil production and
fifteen percent of domestic natural gas production.194
In a final attempt to ensure that offshore drilling would occur in the
areas of the OCS previously banned by the President and by Congress, the
MMS issued a Draft Proposed Program (DPP) on January 16, 2009, just as
the Bush administration was coming to an end.195 The DPP provides for
thirty-one OCS lease sales in areas off Alaska, the Atlantic coast, the Pacific
coast, and in the Gulf of Mexico.19 6 The DPP is an important step in the
process, as the Secretary recognized it as the tool to gather information "al-
lowing the process to move forward in a way that will allow the next Admin-
istration to design a program that meets the objectives of the Nation."97 The
DPP discusses the background and importance of the document:
This DPP is part of a multi-step process to prepare a new 5-Year
Program to possibly replace the current one that began on July 1,
2007, and will end on June 30, 2012. The Secretary instituted the
multi-step program preparation process two years early in order to
provide an opportunity for greater access to domestic energy re-
sources in a shorter time frame . . . . Before the new 5-Year Pro-
gram may be approved and implemented, MMS must accept and
consider comments on the draft proposed program, issue for pub-
lic review and comment a proposed program and draft Environ-
mental Impact Statement (EIS), and issue a proposed final
program and final EIS.198
192. Id. (emphasis in original).
193. See McHale, supra note 2, at 578-79.
194. Sec'y of the Interior, Frequently Asked Questions: Draft Proposed Program,
July 16, 2009, http://www.mms.gov/5-year/FrequentlyAskedQuestionstest.htm.
195. Press Release, Dep't of the Interior, MMS Announces Milestones in Energy
Development: Includes Alternative Energy, Traditional Sources (Jan. 16,
2009), http://www.mms.gov/ooc/press/2009/pressO116.htm.
196. See DRAFT PROPOSED OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS) OIL AND GAS LEAS-
ING PROGRAM 2010-2015, DEP'T OF THE INTERIOR 3 (Jan. 2009), http://www.
mms.gov/5-year/PDFs/2010-2015/DPP%20FINAL%20(HQPrint%20with%20
landscape%20maps,%20map%20 10).pdf.
197. Id. at 2.
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The attempts by the Bush administration to spur offshore drilling in the last
months before leaving office came after Congress, at the end of September
2008, had finally allowed the more than twenty-year-old moratorium on such
activities to expire.199 Per the DPP, the MMS will accept comments for sixty
days beginning January 21, 2009.200 Following this, President Barack
Obama's administration will choose to keep the plan in place, to overhaul it,
or to abandon it entirely.201 In a report accompanying the DPP, the MMS
recognizes the choice facing Barack Obama and his advisors.202 The report
states:
[t]he President has acted to remove the withdrawal without restric-
tions, and Congress has acted to discontinue the annual moratoria
without any further restrictions . . . . This draft proposed program
(DPP) provides the next Administration with the maximum flexi-
bility and the maximum available information to make these im-
portant decisions.203
2. The Future Role of the Judiciary: Alaska Wilderness League v.
Kempthorne
On November 20, 2008, in one of the first judicial reviews of the explo-
ration phase under OCSLA, the Ninth Circuit held that the MMS should have
done a more exhaustive environmental review.204 The case arose from a five-
year plan issued by the MMS in 2002 for lease sales in the Beaufort Sea.205
According to OCSLA, the MMS prepared an Environmental Impact State-
ment (EIS) to analyze "the potential effects of oil exploration and production
on the region's wildlife, environment, and subsistence activities."206 The
MMS then began holding lease sales, and the leases Shell purchased, those at
issue in this case, were purchased in July 2004.207
199. See Cynthia Dizikes, First Step Toward New Oil Drilling, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 13,
2008, available at 2008 WLNR 21650447.
200. Ayesha Rascoe, UPDATE 1-U.S. Government Issues Draft Offshore Drilling
Plan, REUTERS, Jan 16, 2009, http://uk.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUKN1631
193520090116?pageNumber=2&virtualBrandChannel=0&sp=true.
201. See id.
202. See DRAFT PROPOSED OUTER CONTINENTAL SHELF (OCS) OIL AND GAS LEAS-
ING PROGRAM 2010-2015, supra note 196 at 1.
203. Id.
204. See Alaska Wilderness League v. Kempthorne, 548 F.3d 815, 835 (9th Cir.
2008).
205. Id. at 817.
206. Id. at 818.
207. Id.
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OCSLA requires the MMS to approve a lessee's Exploration Plan (EP)
before the lessee, and in this case, Shell may begin drilling in the exploratory
phase.208 In accordance with this part of OCSLA, Shell submitted its EP for
the Beaufort Sea region on November 2006, detailing their "plans to use two
drilling vessels, two icebreaking ships, various other supply boats, and up to
six aircraft."209 Noting that the EP was not yet complete by its standards, the
MMS "sought more information on the 'potential impact of underwater
noise,' conflict avoidance mechanisms, and other mitigation measures that
could ameliorate the deleterious effects of the exploratory drilling."210 The
MMS also requested more specific information about the location of the
wells, which was not given in the final version of the EP that was approved
by the MMS on January 17, 2007.211
During its review, the MMS determined that Shell's activities "would
not significantly affect the quality of the human environment" or "cause 'un-
due or serious harm or damage to the human, marine, or coastal environ-
ment.' "212 Thus, an EIS for this particular EP was not required by the
MMS.213
Petitioners, including the Alaska Wilderness League, the National Re-
sources Defense Council, and the Pacific Environment, filed a Petition for
Review with the Ninth Circuit on April 13, 2007.214 Then, on August 14,
2007, the Ninth Circuit granted the motion to stay until this matter could be
considered on the merits.215
In the Ninth Circuit's decision on the merits, the court upheld the rather
low standard of review used by the D.C. Circuit, looking at "whether the
agency has (1) taken a 'hard look' at the potential impact of its actions; (2)
considered all of the relevant factors in its decision; and (3) provided an
adequate statement of reasons to explain why a project's impacts are insignif-
icant."216 Then, the court turned to the requirements under the NEPA, and
found that "'an EIS must be prepared if 'substantial questions are raised as to
whether a project ... may cause significant degradation of some human envi-
ronmental factor.' "217
208. Id. (citing 30 C.F.R. §250.201 (2007)).
209. Id.
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The court then turned to the merits of the case, determining that the
MMS failed to provide "a convincing statement of reasons explaining why
Shell's exploratory drilling plans at these specific sites would have an insig-
nificant impact on bowhead whales and Inupiat subsistence activities."218
Because the MMS failed to take a "'hard look'" at these issues, the court
determined that the agency had not given sufficient information so as to pre-
clude it from not completing an EIS.219 Therefore, the court ordered the
MMS to either prepare "a more thorough environmental analysis or an EIS,
as necessary, examining the consequences of drilling at these specific
locations."220
Then, turning to the agency's compliance with OCSLA, the court found
that because Shell had not provided locations of proposed drilling sites in
2008 and 2009, the agency could not approve the EP.221 In the end, the court
vacated the MMS's approval of Shell's EP and remanded for the agency to
either prepare a revised EA or an EIS.222
Many environmentalists, including Charles Clusen, the director of the
Alaska Project for the National Resources Defense Council, criticized the
ruling saying that "'Americans are looking for a clean energy future, and
trading animals and their habitat for massive oil company profits is the way
of the past."223 In response to the court's ruling a spokesperson from Shell
responded by saying:
the ruling delays drilling and extends the timeline it will take to
bring this much-needed U.S. production on-line. That timeline
starts only after we drill our first well. While we assess our op-
tions . . . it's important to remember that we hope to make Alaska
a long-term commitment for Shell. We believe developing off-
shore Alaska is the right decision for the citizens of Alaska and
the state's economy and will help provide a secure energy future
for the U.S.224
Several months later, after President Barack Obama took office, the ef-
fects of which will be discussed below, Shell withdrew its EP, effectively
218. Id. at 825.
219. Id. at 833.
220. Id. at 834.
221. See id. at 834-35.
222. Id. at 835.
223. Tony Hopfinger, Court Ruling Jeopardizes Shell's Offshore Drilling Plans in
Alaska, ALASKA DISPATCH, November 20, 2008, http://www.alaskadispatch.
com/dispatches/energy/318-court-ruling-jeopardizes-shells-offshore-drilling-
plans-in-alaska.
224. Id. (internal quotations omitted).
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making the court's decision in this case void.225 The analysis used in the
decision, however, remains valid and sheds light on how the Ninth Circuit
will analyze similar cases in the future. In accordance with OCSLA, any
decision of the Secretary regarding an exploration plan or development and
production plan is subject to judicial review only in a United States Court of
Appeals for a circuit in which an affected state is located.226 Therefore, deci-
sions regarding drilling in the Beaufort Sea or on any part of the OCS in
Alaska will be reviewed by the Ninth Circuit and by the tests laid out in this
decision. Because all such decisions are subject to review in the Ninth Cir-
cuit, this court has an amazing opportunity to stall drilling projects in the
future and may prove to be an insurmountable obstacle to offshore explora-
tion, development, and production.
3. Policy under the Obama Administration
a. During the Election
In the early days of the election, Democratic presidential nominee Ba-
rack Obama supported continuing the moratorium on offshore drilling that
had been in place since President George H.W. Bush.227 In fact, in June 2008
he criticized Republican presidential nominee John McCain for switching
positions on offshore drilling from being opposed to the idea to suggesting
that he would consider it as part of a multi-faceted energy plan. 228 Obama
quipped, "I think he continues to find himself being pushed further and fur-
ther to the right in ways that in my mind don't show a lot of leadership."229
Then, only months later, in August 2008 when Obama unveiled his en-
ergy plan, he too had shifted his stance on offshore drilling.230 Obama went
from being a major opponent of offshore drilling to stating that "[h]e could
live with it if it is done in an environmentally sound way and as part of
comprehensive, bipartisan legislation on energy."231 In an interview with the
Palm Beach Post in August 2008, he defended his perceived flip-flop by
saying:
225. Kempthorne, 571 F.3d 859.
226. 43 U.S.C. § 1349(c)(2) (2006).
227. Michael B. Gerrard, McCain vs. Obama on Environment, Energy, and Re-
sources, 23 NAT. RESOURCES J. 3, 4 (2008).
228. Richard Carson & Alex Brandon, Obama Challenges McCain on Offshore Oil
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[m]y interest is in making sure we've got the kind of comprehen-
sive energy policy that can bring down gas prices . . . . If, in order
to get that passed, we have to compromise in terms of a careful,
well thought-out drilling strategy that was carefully circumscribed
to avoid significant environmental damage - I don't want to be so
rigid that we can't get something done.232
b. In the Early Days of the Administration
Now that the election is over and the magic of Inauguration Day is fad-
ing, many are waiting with baited breath to see how President Barack Obama
will, among other issues, handle the subject of offshore drilling. Before the
President was inaugurated, his Secretary of the Interior, Ken Salazar, was
already discussing the administration's plans for drilling.233 Salazar stated
plainly, "[t]here are places in the OCS where it is appropriate for drill-
ing . . . . There may be other places that are off-limits."234
Not long after he was sworn in on the Capitol steps, Obama ordered all
pending regulations initiated by the previous administration to be halted.235
In the early days, it seemed that the proposal initiated by the Bush adminis-
tration to expand offshore drilling to areas previously under the moratorium
may be continued.236 The plan discussed by Secretary Salazar was not unlike
the plan considered by the Obama administration during the final stages of
the election; it calls for offshore drilling in concert with solar energy, wind
power, and biofuel supplies.237
In line with President Obama's statements on the issue, both during the
campaign and now at the beginning of his administration, Secretary Salazar
mentioned that "[a]s we move forward with the development of our oil and
gas resources, both on-shore and off-shore, they have to be part of a set of a
232. Michael C. Bender, Obama Would Consider Off-Shore Drilling as Part of
Comprehensive Energy Plan, PALM BEACH POST, August 1, 2008, available
at http://www.palmbeachpost.com/state/content/state/epaper/2008/08/0 1/0801
obamal.html.
233. See Daniel Whitten, Salazar Says Obama May Ban Offshore Drilling in Some
Areas, BLOOMBERG, January 15, 2009, available at http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=20601207&sid=A2tq34QdWN I s&refer-energy.
234. Id.
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content/article/2009/01/20/AR2009012004363.html.
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comprehensive energy program."238 Although Salazar mentioned the Gulf of
Mexico as one place to allow more drilling, the Secretary said the Depart-
ment would be considering which areas to open up as the administration
continued. 239
Recently, however, Secretary Salazar announced that the Department
"will require oil and natural-gas companies to clear more regulatory hurdles
before they are allowed to drill on federal lands."240 This seems to be a shift
from both Salazar and Obama's stance in the earlier days of the administra-
tion. Still, since it is fairly early in the Obama administration, and the Presi-
dent seems to have been occupied with the health care debate and other
pressing issues, it is difficult to ascertain which of the President's policies
will mirror his rhetoric from the campaign trail and which policies will not.
Certainly though, oil companies, environmentalists, and the citizens and
leaders of the affected states will be anxious to see whether or not this five-
year program will continue through all phases and allow oil production in
recently prohibited OCS areas.
E. CONCLUSION
While the Obama administration now seems open to drilling in certain
areas of the OCS as part of a comprehensive energy plan, there are still many
obstacles that must be overcome before those areas begin producing oil.
First, the Obama administration, specifically the Secretary of the Interior and
the MMS, must continue the planning and preparation for the 2010-2015
five-year program. Those plans include: amassing large amounts of research
as to the environmental impact of drilling in the OCS areas; requesting and
receiving comments from the public, the governors of the affected states, and
other interested parties; holding lease sales; reviewing the proposed drilling
plans of the oil companies who purchase the leases; allowing the lease-hold-
ing oil companies to begin exploratory drilling; and ultimately working with
those oil companies as they produce oil in the areas that are found to be ripe
with resources.
Then, the Obama administration and those parties lobbying to allow
drilling in the areas of the OCS previously prohibited must continue their
efforts to convince Congress not to renew the congressional moratorium on
drilling. Due to pressure from environmentalists and the democratic majority
in Congress, this will not be an easy task.
Finally, and perhaps most often forgotten, the MMS will have to ensure
that it is reviewing and approving all phases of the program with the scrutiny
required by the D.C. Circuit (in decisions affecting when to grant leases) and
238. Id.
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the Ninth Circuit (in decisions affecting the exploratory and development and
production phases for all OCS areas that fall within the Ninth Circuit's juris-
diction). It seems that for decisions pertaining to the approval of the pre-
leasing and leasing phases, which all come within the D.C. Circuit's jurisdic-
tion, the Secretary and the MMS will have broad discretion. Then, if the
remaining circuits follow the lead of the Ninth Circuit in scrutinizing deci-
sions relating to the exploratory, development, and production phases, the
decisions of the administration in these phases will not be given great defer-
ence, and the Secretary and the MMS will have to ensure that their decisions
properly consider the environmental effects on the OCS areas at issue.
In determining the future of offshore drilling, President Obama will be
forced to listen to two very different and very vocal factions. On the one
hand, there are those who unequivocally support drilling as a necessary step
to ensure energy independence and to cease American reliance on foreign
enemies for these resources once and for all. On the other hand, many Amer-
icans vehemently oppose drilling because of the potential environmental im-
pact they fear it will have and because of their view that it will not yield
enough to sustain the nation's current consumption rate.
With re-election not too far on the horizon, both of these groups of
Americans and political pundits will be watching President Obama's deci-
sions on this issue with particular interest. President Obama's Secretary of
Interior, Ken Salazar, originally committed to continuing plans to drill off-
shore, but only as part of a comprehensive energy plan. One of the questions
that will be posed to both Salazar and Obama is: what exactly will this com-
prehensive energy plan entail? Will it include almost limitless offshore drill-
ing or will it impose severe restrictions making drilling for natural resources
impossible? Will it include restrictions on the natural resources consumed by
Americans? These are questions that have yet to be answered by the new
administration, yet these questions must be answered to understand the con-
tours of the energy plan under President Obama. And, with Salazar's recent
flip-flop on this issue, many more questions may remain for the Obama ad-
ministration in the coming months and years.
As President Obama attempts to handle pressing issues facing America
today, namely the economic crisis and the war, he must also consider his
administration's next steps either towards or away from offshore drilling. In
either direction, Obama risks alienating one group of Americans, but hard
decisions such as this one are all in a day's work for the United States Presi-
dent. Because the energy issue will likely affect our country and the world as
a whole for many future generations, it would behoove President Obama to
carefully consider the effects that offshore drilling will have for decades into
the future and not only during his presidency.
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